Abstract. Dittmann, Katzenbeisser, Schallhart and Veith (IACR ePrint 2004) introduced the notion of invertible media authentication schemes, embedding authentication data in media objects via invertible watermarks. These invertible watermarks allow to recover the original media object (given a secret encryption key), as required for example in some medical applications where the distortion must be removable.
Introduction
The transition from analog to digital media facilitates many tasks but also comes along with continually improved manipulation tools, which allow various modifications of media objects. Thus, it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish authentic from altered objects. To enable a better distinction it is therefore necessary to apply techniques that guarantee authenticity, integrity and possibly secrecy of data.
The straightforward use of digital signatures is not always a satisfying solution to provide authenticity and integrity, because an object and its signature have to be stored separately.
This, however, may not be convenient in the area of multimedia data. To counter this problem fragile watermarks were proposed, which can be used to embed a signature directly into an object, such that any (significant) modification will destroy the watermark and thereby invalidates the signature. Unfortunately, this approach comes with the disadvantage that it always leads to irrevocable distortions in the authenticated object, which may not be acceptable in all applications, e.g., X-ray imaging objects are extremely sensitive to modifications. One solution is to use invertible watermarking schemes, which are special fragile watermarks addressing the need to re-obtain the original media object by allowing a complete removal of the embedded data.
Media Authentication Schemes. Using invertible watermarking schemes in combination with encryption and digital signatures, Dittmann, Katzenbeisser, Schallhart and Veith (DKSV) [DKSV04] introduced the notion of an invertible media authentication scheme that allows reconstruction of the original object. They also propose a framework to build such authentication schemes: To protect a media object O the MAS DKSV scheme first applies an invertible watermarking scheme as proposed by Fridrich et al. [FGD02] , dividing O into two parts A O , B O by running the watermarking algorithm Separate. See Figure 1 . The part B O next gets compressed and encrypted to a ciphertext X that is stored as the first part of the watermark. To achieve an appropriate compressibility level, B O has to be chosen accordingly. The second part of the watermark contains the digital signature s of the encrypted part X and A O , the public part of the object. Finally, the watermark (X, s) is joined with A O to a single protected object O by using the watermarking algorithm Join.
Reconstruction of the original object from O is done by decrypting to recover the part Compress(B O ) and uncompressing this value to get the part B O . A simple join operation with A O merges the parts together again. As for integrity and secrecy, as long as the object is not altered the signature can be verified by using the public verification key, while the reconstruction of the original object is protected by the secret reconstruction key. In contrast to most known watermarking schemes where the security is only analyzed by ad-hoc methods, the media authentication scheme of Dittmann et al. comes with a formal model against malicious modification attempts, following well-known approaches for signature schemes. In [DKSV04] a media authentication scheme is called secure against forgeability if for every adversary it is infeasible to produce an object O and its protected version O for a given verification key. This should even hold if the adversary may ask for protected versions of other objects before.
Our Results (Integrity). Demanding from the adversary to output a pair (O, O) seems to be overly restrictive, since the authentication system should be already considered broken if an adversary merely creates an arbitrary authenticated object O (without knowing a corresponding original object O). Consider for example a governmental organization publishing satellite data O of which parts may be classified as confidential for issues of national security (contained in the encrypted B O part), but which should still allow public verification of authenticity. In this case, the adversary's goal could be to produce other partially protected satellite data bearing a correct signature of the governmental authority, but without any need of being able to generate a matching unprotected object. In this case, the unforgeability definition of Dittmann et al. would provide no security guarantee.
Therefore we propose a stronger definition of unforgeability, which we call strong unforgeability and which prevents attacks like the one above. To show that our definition is indeed strictly stronger than the definition of Dittmann et al., we first give a proof that strong unforgeability implies (basic) unforgeability. After that, we present two examples of media authentication schemes which are secure according to the basic notion, but not according to our enhanced definition.
Before proving that the original scheme of Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] can be lifted to satisfy the notion of strong unforgeability, we need to tweak the signing process. Hopper et al. revealed in [HMW07] that, in the original scheme, an adversary can easily find different objects that generate the same input A O ||X to the signing resp. verification process and thus straightforwardly constitute a forgery. We show that those attacks can be prevented by using an appropriate encoding for computing the signature, where A O and X are clearly separated. Together with a strongly unforgeable signature scheme, this also provides a sufficient condition for a strongly unforgeable media authentication scheme.
Our Results (Secrecy). Another security aspect considered in our paper is secrecy of the original data contained in the protected object. In order to achieve a secure protection of the B O part, Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] propose to use a symmetric encryption scheme. Unfortunately, they neither provide any rigorous security model, nor make any conclusions about the secrecy of their scheme.
In a companion paper, Katzenbeisser and Dittmann [KD04] discuss a desirable secrecy requirement, resembling semantic security of encryption schemes [GM84] where a ciphertext should not reveal anything about the original message. In [KD04] the authors conclude that a similar notion for media authentication schemes "might not be possible to satisfy" because, due to the requirement of good compressibility, the protected part B O is typically not completely random and may statistically depend on the public part A O . Therefore, an adversary may be able to derive some information about the encrypted part from the public part A O . In [KD04] the authors thus outline an alternative (and somewhat non-standard) security definition, but remain rather informal and do not prove that the MAS DKSV scheme achieves the desired level of secrecy.
Our starting point is to note that the fact that A O may reveal some information about B O does not obviate similar claims about the secrecy for the media authentication scheme. The reason, originating in the context of encryption, is that the precise idea of semantic security is that one should not be able to learn anything about a message m from a ciphertext X than what is known about m anyway. For instance, if m is a credit card number sent encrypted, but the card type is transmitted in clear, then the first digit is usually deducible from the type. Secrecy with respect to such side information is therefore the highest security level we can achieve and should aim for.
Adapting the notion of semantic security with side information we give a formal definition of secrecy for media authentication schemes. Our definition basically says that an authentication scheme is considered secure if whatever can be computed from a protected object O = (A O , B O ) could also be derived from the public part A O alone. We can even strengthen our notion to a more realistic scenario where the adversary is able to obtain protected and reconstructed objects of his choice. Based on the formal definition we then consider the secrecy of the media authentication scheme by Dittmann et al. and show that semantic security of the used encryption function is a sufficient condition for the authentication scheme to be semantically secure as well.
Summary. Overall, this paper here complements the work of Dittmann et al. by giving precise security models that describe the guarantees in terms of integrity and secrecy. We introduce the notion of strong unforgeability to strengthen the security against malicious modification attempts and provide the sufficient requirements for an authentication scheme to achieve this security goal. Furthermore we show that secrecy in the sense of semantic security for media authentication schemes can be defined, which is completed by proving secrecy for the construction of Dittmann et al. under reasonable assumptions about the encryption scheme.
Organization. In Section 2 we recall the definition of an invertible media authentication scheme by Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] . In Section 3 we introduce the scheme (or, to be precise, the framework) by Dittmann et al. and the underlying tools (watermarking, encryption and signatures). Section 4 deals with our refinement of integrity of media authentication schemes and relates the notions, whereas Section 5 covers the secrecy aspects of such schemes. We note that, following the terminology of [DKSV04] , in this paper here we deal with offline media authentication only. It is easy to adapt our notions and proofs to the case of online media authentication; we refer to Appendix A for details.
Media Authentication Schemes
An invertible media authentication scheme (MAS), defined by Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] , consists of a set of algorithms allowing to protect a media object. More precisely, an invertible MAS is able to produce a protected media object using the algorithm Protect while retaining the ability to losslessly reconstruct the original media object using algorithm Reconstruct. The ability for lossless reconstruction of protected media objects is typically achieved by using invertible watermarking schemes as introduced by Honsinger et al. [HJRS99] . If a media object has been previously protected, its integrity can be unambiguously verified using algorithm Verify.
Usage of the above algorithms necessitates cryptographic keys for protection as well as reconstruction of media objects, which have to be kept private. However, verification of the integrity of a protected media object assumes a public verification key, thus enabling integrity checks by third parties. The generation of all necessary keys is summarized in a single algorithm GenKey, which takes as input a security parameter and selects keys of the corresponding strength.
Def inition 2.1 An invertible media authentication scheme is a tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms MAS = (GenKey, Protect, Verify, Reconstruct) with the following properties:
• GenKey takes as input a security parameter n (in unary, as 1 n ) and outputs a triple of keys (K P , K V , K R ), where K P is the secret protection key, K V is the public verification key and K R is the secret reconstruction key.
• Protect takes as input a media object O and a protection key K P , and outputs a protected media object O or FAIL, if protection is not possible.
• Verify accepts as input a protected media object O and a verification key K V , and outputs either TRUE or FALSE.
• Reconstruct takes a protected media object O and a reconstruction key K R , and outputs a media object O or FAIL.
Furthermore, we require that verification and reconstruction for valid protected objects always succeeds, i.e., for any media object O, for all keys
The DKSV Media Authentication Scheme
In this section we first recall the basic ingredients of the media authentication scheme by Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] , before presenting the actual MAS DKSV scheme.
Tools
Recall that the basic idea of the MAS DKSV scheme is to divide the object O into a public part A O and a part B O which should be protected. This splitting (and its inverse process) are performed via an invertible watermarking scheme, as described in Section 3.1.1. The B O part is then compressed, encrypted and signed. Encryption and Signatures are therefore described formally in Sections 3.1.2 and 3.1.3.
Watermarking
Watermarking schemes are an alternative to the concept of cryptographic signatures, designed specifically to embed authentication and integrity data within media objects, thus eliminating the need for separate storage. They occur in different security scenarios:
• Fragile watermarking schemes [YM98] may be employed if the integrity of a media object needs to be proven to deem its contents authentic. They are designed to be instantly destroyed when the media object is tampered with.
• Robust watermarking schemes [SBT96] may be employed if for instance the origin of a media object needs to be determined to trace illicit reproduction. Robust watermarks withstand most digital processing operations in video clips and digital images and can be recognized even after several alterations. However, in order to provide such a tamper-resistant method, straightforward usage of cryptographic signatures is all but impossible.
Since robust watermarking schemes are inherently unable to retain cryptographic signatures in a coherent manner, their usuage is infeasible in our scenario of media authentication schemes providing secrecy and integrity in a provable way. On the other hand, when employing fragile watermarking schemes, the embedding process induces distortions into the original media object, thus inevitably altering the original. Although sophisticated embedding algorithms induce a barely visible distortion into the media object, a lossless reconstruction may be desirable.
Invertible watermarking schemes are often a special case of fragile watermarks and have been introduced by Honsinger et al. [HJRS99] to address the need to re-obtain the original media object. Fridrich et al. [FGD02] later proposed a general framework for invertible watermarking schemes that uses lossless compression to allow the reversion of the embedding process. Thereby, the ability to embed data into a media object O is accomplished by two polynomial-time algorithms Join and Separate: 
, then we call the pair (Join, Separate) an invertible watermarking scheme.
Note that the completeness condition above also provides some sort of collision-resistance for the Separate algorithm. Namely, for any objects
Otherwise, if Separate returned the same output for some O = O ′ , then Join would sometimes fail to recover the right object O or O ′ from these identical outputs. The analogous argument applies to Join. We note that we could also use a relaxed version in which "bad" objects O = O ′ may exist, but then they are hard to find in reasonable time (similar to collision-resistance of hash functions). Our results remain valid under this relaxed version.
When using Separate in invertible watermarking schemes, visually insignificant data is usually assigned to the second part B O , which will afterwards be losslessly compressed. The newly gained free space is then used to embed secrecy and integrity data. This enhanced part of a media object will be denoted with B O . After the embedding process, A O and B O are reassembled using Join to form the protected media object O.
However, since a compression algorithm is necessary during protection, we have to keep in mind that the media object is expected to contain a certain amount of redundancy to be compressed densely enough since a minimum set of secrecy and integrity data needs to be embedded within the freed space. With negligible possibility, a media object O may fail to meet the minimum requirement. In such a case, the invertible watermarking scheme fails.
Encryption
A symmetric encryption scheme E = (GenEnc, Enc, Dec) consists of three probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms, where algorithm GenEnc on input 1 n generates a key K E , algorithm Enc on input K E and message m ∈ {0, 1} * outputs a ciphertext X, and algorithm Dec also takes K E and a ciphertext X and returns m ∈ {0, 1} * or FAIL. Furthermore, for all keys K E produced by GenEnc(1 n ), all messages m ∈ {0, 1} * and ciphertexts X ← Enc(K E , m), we have m = Dec(K E , X).
As for security of encryption schemes we follow the idea of semantic security, as defined by Goldwasser and Micali [GM84] . Informally, the idea of semantic security for encryption schemes is that any information f enc (m) an efficient adversary could learn about a message m from a ciphertext X could also be computed efficiently without X. All this holds of course relative to any side information about m. This extra knowledge about m is typically formalized by having some side information hist m about the message m.
For notational convenience we denote by (m, hist m ) ← (M, hist enc )(1 n ) the joint sampling process in which the message m is picked according to distribution M(1 n ) and, at the same time, side information hist m is generated according to algorithm hist enc (1 n ). Note that in this process both algorithms M and hist enc may share state.
Def inition 3.1 A symmetric encryption scheme E = (GenEnc, Enc, Dec) is called semantically secure (with respect to side information hist enc ) if for every probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm A enc there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms S enc , the simulator, such that for every polynomial-time distribution M and any function f enc the difference
is negligible, where
We note that Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] do not make any security claim about the underlying encryption scheme in their MAS. See also the discussion in Section 5. Finally, we remark that semantic security (with respect to any side information) is a very common property of modern encryption schemes, and is usually met by all practical and theoretical solutions (cf. [Gol04] ).
Signature Schemes
A signature scheme S = (GenSign, Sign, SigVerify) consists of probabilistic polynomialtime algorithms such that algorithm GenSign on input 1 n generates a key pair (K V S , K SS ) ← GenSign(1 n ), algorithm Sign for input K SS and a message m ∈ {0, 1} * outputs a signature s ← Sign(K SS , m), and algorithm SigVerify for input K V S , m and s returns a decision d ← SigVerify(K V S , m, s) which is either TRUE or FALSE. Additionally, for all security parameters n, all keys (K V S , K SS ) ← GenSign(1 n ), all messages m ∈ {0, 1} * and all signatures s ← Sign(K SS , m) it holds SigVerify(K V S , m, s) = TRUE.
Below we define a strong notion of security for signature schemes, called strong unforgeability, which supersedes the common notion of unforgeability for signatures (cf. [Gol04] ).
Roughly, strong unforgeability also prevents the adversary from producing new signatures for previously signed messages (even if the adversary can see other signatures for chosen message through a signature oracle Sign(K SS , ·)):
Def inition 3.2 A signature scheme S = (GenSign, Sign, SigVerify) is called strongly unforgeable if for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A sig ,
, where we let m i denote the i-th query to oracle Sign(K SS , ·) and s i the oracle's answer to this query output 1 if and only if
Note that in the regular notion of unforgeability we strengthen the requirement on (m * , s * ) in the experiment above, and demand that m * = m i for all i (such that finding another signature s * to a given pair m i , s i is no longer considered a successful attack). In particular, if a scheme is strongly unforgeable, then it is also unforgeable in the basic sense. Yet, it is also easy to construct an unforgeable signature scheme which does not achieve the stronger notion, e.g., if for each signature the signing algorithm appends a redundant bit which the verification algorithm simply ignores.
Efficient strongly unforgeable signature schemes exist both in the random oracle model [BR96, BLS04] and in the standard model [CS00, Fis03, BSW06] . Existentially they can be derived from any one-way function [NY89, Rom90, Gol04] and are thus based on the same complexity assumption as signature schemes which are unforgeable in the ordinary sense.
The MAS DKSV Scheme
With the tools of the previous sections we can now recapture the MAS DKSV scheme. To protect a media object O the MAS DKSV scheme first uses the watermarking scheme to determine the parts A O and B O . Then the B O part is first compressed to C O and, together with a hash value H(O) of the object, encrypted to a ciphertext X.
2 The resulting ciphertext and the public part A O of the original media object O are signed together with the signature algorithm, s ← Sign(K SS , (A O , X)). The values X and s are finally joined with A O into a single media object O.
The integrity of a protected object O can be verified by anyone by recovering A O , X, s from the protected object and verifying the signature s for (A O , X). This can be done without decrypting X and recovering B O . Reconstruction then can easily be achieved by first verifying O and then decrypting with K E . After uncompressing
The role of H(O) concerning the security of the scheme remains somewhat unclear, i.e., Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] never specify any security requirements on H. It appears that security-wise H does not serve any purpose. We include H here only for sake of completentess; the reader may simply think of H as the function with empty output.
Join can be applied to (A O , B 
• Algorithm GenKey on input 1 n runs the key generation algorithms of the signature scheme and the encryption scheme, (K SS , K V S ) ← GenSign(1 n ) and K E ← GenEnc(1 n ), and outputs
• Algorithm Protect on input K P and object O first splits the object by computing
and joins it together with A O and X into the protected object O ← Join(A O , (X, s)).
It outputs O (or FAIL if any of the deployed algorithms returns FAIL).
• Algorithm Verify on input K V and a protected object O splits the protected object into (A O , (X, s)) ← Separate(O) and returns the output of the signature verification algorithm for these data, SigVerify(K V S , (A O , X), s) (which equals FAIL in the special case that Separate returned FAIL before).
• Algorithm Reconstruct takes as input K R and a protected object O, and only con- 
Integrity of Media Authentication Schemes
In this section we address integrity protection of media authentication schemes. We first review the definition of Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] about unforgeability of MAS 3 and then present our improved security guarantee, denoted by strong unforgeability. We show that strong unforgeability is strictly stronger than the notion of Dittmann et al., and finally prove that the MAS DKSV scheme achieves the stronger notion if instantiated with the right primitives.
Definitions
The original unforgeability requirement of Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] demands that, without the protection key, it is infeasible to find an object O and its protected version O, even after having seen other protected objects:
Def inition 4.1 Let MAS = (GenKey, Protect, Verify, Reconstruct) be an invertible media authentication scheme. It is called unforgeable if for every probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm A DKSV the value Prob Exp mas-unf MAS,ADKSV (n) = 1 is negligible, where
(1 n , K V ) where O i denotes the i-th query to oracle Protect(·, K P ) and O i the oracle's answer to this query output 1 if and only if
We note that Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] claim their scheme to be secure under this definition. However, as mentioned before, Hopper et al. [HMW07] point out a gap in this proof, exploiting a weak encoding for the signing algorithm. Patching the signature and verification process as described in Construction 3.3 gives a version which is indeed secure according to this definition here (if the signature scheme achieves basic unforgeability). This can be easily inferred from the security proof for our stronger notion in the next section, and we therefore omit a formal proof for this simpler fact.
Our first definitional strengthening concerns the adversary's task to find a protected object O together with its original counter part O. Recall the satellite data example from the introduction, where the adversary's goal is only to produce another valid protected object without knowing a matching object in clear. Then the previous definition would provide no security guarantee in this case. In fact, as we will discuss later, there are even schemes satisfying the unforgeability notion above but which fail to meet the stronger requirement in the example. In our refinement below we therefore reduce the requirement on the adversary's output and merely demand that the attacker outputs a new protected object O.
The other strengthening refers to availability of other components of a system. Since the algorithms may operate in a highly interactive setting, we follow the conservative approach in cryptography and allow our algorithm A strong to also communicate with a Reconstruct oracle, enabling him to reconstruct objects of his choice. Note that verification can be carried out locally by the adversary with the help of the public key anyway. With these two refinements we obtain the following definition:
Def inition 4.2 Let MAS = (GenKey, Protect, Verify, Reconstruct) be an invertible media authentication scheme. It is called strongly unforgeable if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A strong the value Prob Exp mas-stunf MAS,Astrong (n) = 1 is negligible, where 
Experiment Exp
mas-stunf MAS,Astrong (n) (K P , K V , K R ) ← GenKey(1 n ) O ← A Protect(·,KP ),Reconstruct(·,KR) strong (1 n , K V )
On the Relationship of the Notions
In this section we show that security according to our definition of strong unforgeability is strictly stronger than the one for the definition by Dittmann et al. This is done in two steps. First we will show that our definition implies the definition of Dittmann et al. After that, we provide two examples of schemes which are secure according to the basic notion but not to the enhanced definition. We remark that the separating examples even hold if we augment the DKSV definition by giving A DKSV access to a Reconstruct oracle. This difference merely stems from the fact that A DKSV has to output a pair (O, O), compared to O as in our definition.
Strong Unforgeability Implies Unforgeability
Proposition 4.3 If an invertible MAS scheme is strongly unforgeable then it is also unforgeable.
Proof 
by the completeness property of media authentication schemes, this would contradict the assumption O = O i . This means that none of the O i 's received from Protect can be used for a successful forgery by the attacker A DKSV . Since the main difference between the two definitions lies in the condition on the adversary's output, the attacker A DKSV is also successful according to our definition when dropping O from the output.
Separating Example #1
In this example we show that for specific instantiation of the MAS DKSV there exists a successful adversary A strong against the strong unforgeability, while any attacker A DKSV against the basic notion of unforgeability fails. This shows that strong unforgeability is a strictly stronger notion.
Recall that in the (patched) MAS DKSV scheme the Protect algorithm computes
and outputs the protected object
Now suppose that we use a trivial signature scheme where verification succeeds all the time, independently of the input, that is SigVerify(K V S , m, s) = TRUE for all inputs m, s. Then we also have
Now an attacker A strong against strong unforgeability can output any protected object O, without having queried the Protect oracle (but such that Separate(O) = FAIL). With our assumption about the signature scheme, the attacker succeeds with probability 1, because verification Verify(K V S , O) always returns TRUE. Note that the adversary A strong wins for any choice for the symmetric encryption scheme and the function H. We can therefore use an encryption scheme which satisfies a security notion called INT-CTXT [BN00] , i.e., if one sees ciphertexts for adaptively chosen messages and decryptions for chosen ciphertexts, then without the secret encryption key it is still infeasible to create a valid ciphertext for a new message. We also select H to be collisionresistant. With these choices we can next prove that there is no adversary against basic unforgeability of this instantiation of the MAS DKSV scheme.
Consider any attacker A DKSV against basic unforgeability for our instantiation, i.e., with the trivial signature verification algorithms, the INT-CTXT encryption scheme and the collision-resistant hash function. Adversary A DKSV may ask the Protect oracle several times (as well as the Reconstruct oracle if we augment the DKSV definition accordingly), before outputting a pair (O, O). Note that in contrast to strong unforgeability, here O additionally has to be from the set of protected objects of O: 
Separating Example #2
We give another separating example for the patched MAS DKSV framework where, in contrast to the previous example, we make no further assumptions about the encryption scheme and the hash function. Here, we merely assume that the signature scheme is not strongly unforgeable, i.e., where one can easily transform a signature s to a message m into another valid signature s * = s. With this instantiation choice there exists a successful attack against the strong unforgeability, but which does not constitute a break against basic unforgeability.
The adversary against the strong unforgeability calls the Protect oracle only once about an object O to derive a protected object O = Join (A O , (X, s) ). The attacker next runs Separate(O) to obtain A O = A O and (X, s). Since the signature scheme is not strongly unforgeable the attacker can now compute another valid signature s * = s for (A O , X). He finally outputs O * = Join(A O , (X, s * )) as the forgery attempt. The attack succeeds according to the strong unforgeability, because s * = s and thus O * was never received from the Protect oracle before, and Verify evaluates to TRUE. In the DKSV definition of an attack, however, an attacker must output (O, O). So in our case, prepending O to O * would not constitute a successful attack as O has been sent to the Protect oracle before. In fact, it is easy to see from our proof in the next section that any attacker fails according to the DKSV definition if the underlying signature scheme achieves basic unforgeability.
Strong Unforgeability of the MAS DKSV -Scheme
We next prove that the MAS DKSV scheme achieves strong unforgeability if the underlying signature scheme is strong enough. Note again that this statement necessitates the patch of the signature and verification algorithm; else the attack by Hopper er al. would still apply.
Theorem 4.4 (Strong Unforgeability) If the signature scheme S is strongly unforgeable then the MAS DKSV media authentication scheme in Construction 3.3 is strongly unforgeable.
Proof. If there would be a successful attacker A strong on the MAS DKSV according to our strong definition, then by using the prerequisites we could use this attacker to construct a successful attacker A sig against the strong unforgeability of the deployed signature scheme. In the following we will show the construction of such an attacker A sig . The attacker A sig on the signature scheme gets the signature public key K V S as input. He chooses an encryption key K E and passes the key K V = K V S to A strong to start a black-box simulation. In this simulation of A strong , adversary A sig can easily answer queries of A strong to oracle Reconstruct with the help of the key
. If any of the algorithms returns FAIL then A sig immediately returns FAIL to A strong , else A sig passes m i = (A Oi , X i ) to his Sign-oracle to get a signature s i . Thereafter he returns O i = Join(A Oi , (X i , s i )) to attacker A strong . Once A strong outputs a protected object O and stops, adversary A sig runs Separate on O to obtain A O and (X, s). Now A sig outputs m * = (A O , X) and s * = s. It is obvious that A sig perfectly mimics the Protect oracle as well as the Reconstruct oracle in A strong 's emulation. It remains to show that A sig succeeds in his attack whenever A strong wins. If A strong 's output O satisfies Verify(O, K V ) = TRUE then in particular SigVerify(K V S , m * , s * ) for A sig 's output will also be TRUE and
We have to show that the pair (m * , s * ) = ((A O , X), s) has not appeared in A sig 's interactions with the signature oracle. This is clearly true if, in the i-th request, A sig returned s i = FAIL before even querying the signature oracle, namely, if separation, compression or encryption failed. If, on the other hand, O i = FAIL for the i-th interaction, because the final Join in the simulation of the protection query returned FAIL, but a message m i = (A Oi , X i ) was still signed with s i , then we must have (m * , s (X i , s i ) ).
Hence, if attacker A strong on the media authentication scheme is successful, attacker A Sig will also succeed with the same probability, because (m * , s * ) was never received from the Sign-oracle and SigVerify(K V S , m * , s * ) = TRUE.
Secrecy of Media Authentication Schemes
Recall that the scheme by Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] introduces an encryption scheme in order to protect the B O -part of an object O. However, in their paper they do not provide any claim about the secrecy under reasonable conditions about the encryption scheme, not to mention a rigorous security model. In a companion paper, though, Katzenbeisser and Dittmann [KD04] discuss a desirable secrecy requirement, resembling semantic security of encryption schemes (as defined in Section 3.1.2). Yet, their proposal advocates a somewhat elliptical mixture between semantic security and indistinguishability of encryption schemes (cf. [Gol04] ), and remains rather sketchy. It also remains unclear if, or under which conditions, the MAS DKSV scheme meets this goal.
Recall that the idea behind semantic security of an encryption scheme was that anything an efficient adversary could learn about a message m from a ciphertext X could also be computed efficiently without X. Here we discuss that, by using appropriate notions of secrecy with side information, we can indeed define secrecy for media authentication schemes in the sense of semantic security. Our definition basically says that an MAS provides secrecy if whatever one can compute from a protected object O (including the public part A O ) could also be derived from A O alone. We then continue to show that semantic security of the encryption function (with respect to side information) also guarantees secrecy of the MAS DKSV scheme.
Definition
The definition below follows the one for semantic security of encryption (with respect to side information) closely. Namely, we again compare the success probability of an adversary predicting some information f MAS (O) of an object O from the protected version O (and hist O ) with the prediction success of a simulator given only hist O . For a secure MAS these probabilities should be close.
We write O for the distribution of the objects and hist MAS for the algorithm computing the side information. For notational convenience we again denote by (O, hist O ) ← (O, hist MAS )(1 n ) the joint sampling process, possibly sharing state between the two algorithms.
Def inition 5.1 An invertible media authentication scheme MAS is called semantically secure with respect to side information hist MAS if for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm A MAS , there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm S MAS , the simulator, such that for every polynomial-time distribution O of objects and for every function f MAS , the 
We remark that we can even strengthen the notion above by granting A MAS access to oracles Protect(·, K P ) and Reconstruct(·, K R ) (with the restriction that the adversary never queries the reconstruct oracle about the challenge O, enabling a trivial attack otherwise). Assuming chosen-plaintext security of the underlying encryption scheme (where the adversary is also allowed to see ciphertexts of arbitrary messages via an oracle Enc(K E , ·)), our result also holds under this more advanced attack model, as we will discuss after the proof for the basic case. Interestingly, the proof for this extension also takes advantage of our notion of strong unforgeability.
Secrecy of the MAS DKSV -Scheme
The following theorem shows that semantic security of the encryption scheme carries over to the secrecy of the MAS DKSV scheme: . Let E be a semantically secure encryption scheme (with respect to side information hist enc = hist MAS ). Then the invertible media authentication scheme MAS DKSV in Construction 3.3 is semantically secure with respect to side information hist MAS .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that MAS DKSV is not semantically secure (with respect to the given side information hist MAS ). We will show that this allows to construct a successful attacker A enc on the semantic security encryption function (for side information hist enc ), which will contradict the initial assumption about the security of the encryption scheme.
Recall that a successful attacker A MAS is able to compute information f MAS (O, hist O ) for an object O distributed according to O from O, such that no simulator can approximate this success probability close enough (here f MAS and O may depend on the simulator). We now construct our adversary A enc against the encryption scheme, having a non-negligible advantage over any simulator on predicting the results of some function f enc and some message distribution M.
The specific information and distribution for adversary A enc are defined in terms of O and f MAS used by A MAS :
Next we define our attacker A enc against the encryption scheme. This attacker gets a ciphertext X ← Enc(K E , m) together with side information hist m = A O as input (where the values m and hist m are sampled according to M O and hist enc ). Adversary A enc next "wraps" the ciphertext X into a protected object and then uses A MAS to derive some information about the original message m. More precisely, A enc first generates signature keys (K SS , K V S ) ← GenSign(1 n ) and then uses these keys to compute a protected object O:
Then A enc invokes algorithm A MAS on inputs K V = K V S and O as created above, and on hist O = A O . It waits to receive some answer a and stops with output a, too. Note that the input to A MAS in the simulation above is identically distributed to genuine data in experiment Exp mas-sem,O,fMAS,histMAS MAS,AMAS (n). Therefore, if the output a of the adversary
, then it also matches the value f enc (m, hist m ) by construction. Hence, A enc succeeds with the same probability in the attack on the encryption scheme, as A MAS does in the attack on the media authentication scheme.
It remains to show that attacker A enc has a non-negligible advantage over any simulator in predicting the function value f enc . That is, we still need to prove that there is no simulator S enc being as successful as the attacker A enc . This will follow because, if there was an almost equally successful simulator S enc , then we can construct a simulator S MAS approximating A MAS close enough, contradicting the assumption about the insecurity of the media authentication scheme.
Suppose that there was an appropriate simulator S enc for the encryption case (for all message distributions and all functions f enc and thus for all distributions and functions as constructed above). Then we build a simulator S MAS for the MAS as follows. S MAS gets K V = K V S and A O as inputs. To run a black-box simulation of S enc the MAS simulator defines hist m = A O and invokes S enc on hist m to derive some information a. Simulator S MAS copies a and stops.
We observe that the data in the black-box simulation has the same distribution as in the experiment of S enc . Thus, by construction S MAS successfully predicts f MAS (O, A O ) whenever S enc 's output satisfies the value f enc (m, hist m ) of the previously defined function f enc . But then the success probability of S MAS is identical to the one of S enc , which in turn approximates A enc 's probability of winning the encryption experiment closely by assumption. Since A enc 's success probability is identical to the one of A MAS attacking the secrecy of the media authentication scheme, we conclude that there would be a good simulator S MAS for A MAS (for all O and f MAS ).
Overall we have shown that we can construct an successful attacker on the encryption if MAS DKSV is not semantically secure, contradicting the assumption that the encryption function used within the scheme is semantically secure. This completes the proof.
Finally, we discuss that our proof extends to the case that we grant the adversary A MAS access to a Protect-oracle and to a Reconstruct-oracle. Recall that our proof idea is to turn an adversary A MAS against the MAS into one against the encryption scheme. To this end, our attacker A enc against the encryption scheme has simulated a Protect-oracle with the help of the given ciphertext. Here, A enc now has to answer additional Protect queries of A MAS , and we assume that A enc is also given access to an encryption oracle Enc(K E , ·) initialized with the same key with which the input ciphertext X has been produced (chosenplaintext security).
For each query O i of A MAS to its putative oracle Protect, algorithm A enc extracts (A Oi , B Oi ) ← Separate(O i ), compresses C Oi ← Compress(B Oi ) and computes the hash value H(O i ). It sends C Oi ||H(O i ) to its Enc-oracle to receive a ciphertext X i , and signs this ciphertext together with A Oi using the chosen signature key, s i ← Sign(K SS , (A Oi , X i )). Adversary A enc returns O i ← Join(A Oi , (X i , s i )) to A MAS as the answer of the Protectoracle.
For each query O i of A MAS to its putative Reconstruct-oracle algorithm A enc proceeds as follows. If O i has been the answer to one of a previously simulated Protect-oracle calls then A enc looks up the corresponding query O i and returns this object. In any other case A enc returns FAIL.
We note that the Protect-oracle is simulated perfectly by A enc . The Reconstructoracle gives consistent answers, except for the case that A MAS submits a valid protected object but which has not been produced by a simulated Protect-query. But this would straightforwardly contradict the unforgeability of the MAS scheme (assuming that the signature algorithm is strongly unforgeable and the Separate algorithm is collision-resistance, see Theorem 4.4).
4 Hence, this can only happen with negligible probability. The rest of the proof now carries over easily.
A Online Media Authentication
Dittmann et al. [DKSV04] introduce the notion of online media authentication schemes where objects O are dividied into chunks O 1 ||O 2 || . . . ||O m of equal length, and Protect produces (in a stateful process) "protected chunks" O i from each O i for i = 1, 2, . . . , m. For such protected chunks it should be possible to verify authenticity of sub sequences O i || . . . ||O j of the protected chunks (say, if one publishes only parts of recorded satellite data).
Ditmmann et al. extend their definition of unforgeability by allowing the adversary to output a sequence (O i , O i ) , . . . , (O j , O j ) such that O i || . . . ||O j has never appeares as a subsequence in one of the Protect queries. They also give a slight modification of their basic scheme achieving online authentication, using hash chains.
Here we briefly outline that both our notion of strong unforgeability as well as the strongly unforgeable scheme can be easily extended to capture such online authentication as well (even without further cryptographic assumption). First, our definition of strong unforgeability now asks the adversary to output a sequence O i || . . . ||O j such that this sequence has never been part of a reply of Protect. Then, we modify the DKSV scheme with the strong unforgeable signature scheme as described next.
For each new object to be authenticated we pick a unique string ID of some fixed length (either by using a counter or by picking a sufficiently long random string). Then we apply our basic protection algorithm to each chunk O i , but where we now compute the signature as s i ← Sign(K SS , (A Oi , X i , ID, i )) and build O i ← Join(A Oi , (X, s, ID, i)), i.e., we include the identifier ID and the chunk number i (encoded by some fixed-length encoding · ) into the protected chunk. To verify correctness of a sequence of protected chunks we verify the correctness of each chunk and also check that each chunk carries the identical identifier ID and that chunk numbers i appear in consecutive order. Only if all these tests succeed then we accept the sequence as valid.
It is not hard to see that our security proof carries over to this extension (given that the signature scheme is strongly unforgeable and that the Separate algorithm is collisionresistant), thus providing a solution without further cryptographic assumption.
